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This paper presents a non-equilibrium, agent-based model of workers
and ﬁrms, with on-the-job searching, endogenous entrepreneurial decisions
and endogenous wage and income determination. Workers and ﬁrms are
heterogeneous, and learn their strategy in the labor market. The model
is able to reproduce a number of stylized facts generally accepted in labor
economics and industrial organization, such as the Wage, Beveridge and
Okun curve, and the skewness of wage, income and ﬁrm size distribution.
Most interestingly, important stylized facts such as a negatively sloped
Wage Curve and a constant returns to scale matching function emerge
only out-of-equilibrium, during the adjustment processes toward the sta-
tionary state. Thus, from a theoretical point of view the model suggests
that taking these stylized facts as “building blocks” of equilibrium models
might be misleading. The results stress two additional points. From a
methodological point of view, the use of non-equilibrium computational
models allows for a more comprehensive investigation of the labor mar-
ket, by considering the endogenous character of many relevant variables.
From an empirical point of view, the joint determination of all aggregate
relationships and their dependence on the equilibrium or non-equilibrium
state of the system suggest to move from the investigation of empirical
regularities in isolation one from the other to a joint analysis.
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Beveridge, Okun, Wage Curve.
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11 Introduction
[I]f a model of unemployment conforms to the long-run equilibrium re-
quirements of balanced growth, it is the most suitable starting point for
the extensions that will eventually explain unemployment in real economies.
(C.A. Pissarides, Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, Preface to the First
Edition)
This sentence contains both an act of faith and an admission of weakness.
It recognizes that a macroeconomic equilibrium theory of unemployment such
as the one described in the very well known book by Pissarides is not able to
fully explain “real” unemployment. But it posits that any advance in the task
will have to start from the methodological perspective of equilibrium analysis.
The present work aims to show that this may not be the case, and that impor-
tant insights may be gained by non-equilibrium models. Here, non-equilibrium
means that equilibrium is not imposed. Rather, it may emerge from the in-
teraction of all individual behaviors, when some aggregate variables become
stationary.
The non-equilibrium model developed in this paper is able to reproduce a
number of stylized facts generally accepted in labor economics and industrial
organization, such as the Wage, Beveridge and Okun curve, and the skewness of
wage, income and ﬁrm size distribution. Most interestingly, important stylized
facts such as a negatively sloped Wage Curve and a constant returns to scale
matching function appear to be robust properties of the system only out-of-
equilibrium, during the adjustment processes toward the stationary state.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on unem-
ployment theory. Section 3 sets up the model. Section 4 describes the computer
simulation used to solve it, while section 5 presents the results. In particular,
section 5.4 focuses on the stationary state properties of the system, section 5.5
describes the shocks that take the system out of its stationary state and ﬁnally
section 5.6 deals with the out-of-equilibrium properties during the adjustment
processes. Section 6 draws the conclusions and gives indication for future work.
2 The literature
In the economic literature, search models have become the standard reference
for the analysis of unemployment. They originated from the work by Stigler [39]
on the economics of information, who considered a buyer choosing the number
of price quotations before beginning the search process, in order to minimize
expected price plus sampling cost. Search models were ﬁrst applied to labor
issues, in a more dynamic perspective, with the work of Phelps et al. [30]. A
surge in this strand of the literature occurred during the eighties, with major
contributions by Diamond [13] [14] [15], Mortensen [23] [24], and Pissarides [32]
[31]. Mortensen and Pissarides [26] and Pissarides [33] themselves provide ex-
tensive reviews of search models for the labor market. Search models rely on
three pillars: the decision of workers, the decision of ﬁrms and the wage setting
2mechanism. Search activity is costly for individuals, who compare the utility
of possibly getting a job with their actual utility (which may come from unem-
ployment beneﬁts, or from their present wage if on-the-job searching is allowed),
thus computing the equivalent of an arbitrage equation for the valuation of an
option (selling their unit of labor) in a perfect capital market. When two-sided
search is considered, instead of considering an exogenous number of vacancies
as in simpler models, the search process by ﬁrms is explicitly modeled. Vacancy
opening is costly for ﬁrms. They thus make optimizing choices by comparing
expected proﬁts from posting a vacancy with those of leaving the growth op-
portunity unexploited. In a competitive economy these proﬁts have to be null,
allowing for simpler solutions. Wage setting follows two approaches. The most
common considers a Nash bargaining solution, while the other approach con-
siders wage posting by the ﬁrms. In both cases, a wage must eventually be set.
Ideally, wages should also be endogenous, and lead to a right-skewed, long tailed
wage distribution, as observed in the empirical evidence [27]. Diamond [12] was
one of the ﬁrst to address this issue. However, his model produces a single equi-
librium wage, equal to the value of unemployment beneﬁts, even if ﬁrms have
diﬀerent productivity levels. A number of models leading to non-degenerate
wage distributions, both in the market for goods and in the market for labor,
were subsequently developed. Firms oﬀer higher wages in order to attract or
retain more or better workers. A number of mechanisms, including on-the-job
searching and workers heterogeneity (with respect to the utility derived from
unemployment, or to productivity) can lead to such an outcome - see [36] for
a detailed survey. Finally, ex-ante suitable jobs may include the entire stock
of jobs (urn-ball matching) or, in case job seekers have complete information
about available vacancies, may include only new jobs (stock-ﬂow matching).
From an aggregate point of view the search activity leads to a matching
function that (positively) relates the number of matches to the unemployment
rate and the number of vacancies [6] [29]. The analysis of labor markets through
aggregate matching models is a stream of research on its own. While search
models have demonstrated the existence of equilibria in a decentralized wage
setting with frictions, starting from the analysis of the micro-foundations of such
a market, the matching function has focused on the ﬂow of hiring, although from
an aggregate point of view. Only recently have the links between micro-founded
search models and the aggregate matching function been investigated [9] [37]
[21].
The common feature of all these models is that they are equilibrium models,
with perfectly rational, optimizing agents. They are solved by imposing equilib-
rium conditions that simplify the structural equations of the model. Moreover,
the need for analytical solutions forces the models to include only limited fea-
tures: in standard search models ﬁrms do not exist, being totally replaced by
vacancies, i.e. single-job entities 1; job destruction is generally exogenously
given; on-the-job searching, as the possibility of sending out multiple applica-
1this is where the separation between unemployment theory and ﬁrm demography comes
from
3tions, is not allowed; entrepreneurial decisions are absent. These issues have
been separately addressed, but only one at the time, due do the analytical in-
tractability of more complicated models. 2
However, despite providing important insights this stream of research has
not been able to jointly account for multiple empirically observed “stylized
facts”. Set aside the paradoxical separation between matching theory and ﬁrm
demography, with regularities such as the Power Law distribution of ﬁrm size
and proﬁtability [4] [18] [28] that remain largely unaddressed, the equilibrium
theory of unemployment largely failed to jointly explain three well-documented
aggregate properties of the labor market, i.e. the Wage, Beveridge and Okun
curve [16]. The Wage Curve (WC) postulates a negative relationship between
the average wage ¯ w and the unemployment rate u [7] [11]. The Beveridge Curve
(BC) postulates a negative relationship between the unemployment rate and
the vacancy rate v, which shifts inward and outward during the transition peri-
ods. Finally, the Okun Curve (OC) describes a negative, linear and more than
proportional relationship between the changes in the unemployment rate ˙ u and
the GDP growth rate g [34] [3]. While the Okun curve is mainly an empiri-
cal regularity and it is not clearly grounded in economic theory, the Beveridge
curve is an equilibrium relation theoretically derived from the assumptions on
the matching function (being the analogue of an isoquant for a production func-
tion). Its empirical evidence, however, is rather weak. The Wage curve, well
grounded in the empirical evidence, is generally posited as one of the building
blocks of imperfect labor markets, as a quasi-labor supply function ([11] how-
ever, remains skeptical). Its plausibility rests, for instance, on eﬃciency wages
or union bargaining considerations. When interpreted as one side of the market,
it gives rise to the usual identiﬁcation issues, which suggest the use of adequate
instruments.
A completely diﬀerent approach has tried to jointly address all the points
listed above by means of agent-based computational models. Agent-based mod-
els are computer programs that simulate the behavior of the basic entities in
the system (i.e. workers and ﬁrms), given speciﬁc interaction rules. Aggre-
gate behavior is thus reconstructed “from the bottom up”.3 In particular, Dosi
and co-authors [16] were able to reproduce the three aggregate curves described
above with an evolutionary model focusing on the interactions of the ﬁrms with
the output market. Gallegati and co-authors [19] worked in the direction of
ﬁlling the gap between ﬁrm demography and unemployment theory by focusing
on the interactions of the ﬁrms with the ﬁnancial system.
In line with [35], the present work follows the agent-based computational
economics (ACE) approach, and develops a simple model of the labor mar-
ket with no interactions either with the output market or with the ﬁnancial
system. The model is characterized by heterogeneous agents, heterogeneous
ﬁrms, entrepreneurship, on-the-job search, variable search eﬀort and evolution-
2Models with endogenous job destruction include [1], [10] and [25]. On-the-job searching
was ﬁrst considered by [8] and [20]. Entrepreneurship has been the focus of [17]. Multiple
applications have been considered by [2].
3For a methodological discussion on agent-based computational models, see [40] and [22].
4ary learning.
3 The model
The players in the model are individuals and ﬁrms. Individuals diﬀer with
respect to their productivity and their entrepreneurial attitude. They decide to
either do nothing, search for a new job or start a new business. Firms diﬀer
with respect to their growth potential and their attitude toward workers. They
decide how many vacancies to open and the wage they oﬀer to applicants.
Workers and ﬁrms meet in a single labor market.
3.1 Workers
3.1.1 Payoﬀs
Wages (and wage oﬀers) are a ﬁrm-speciﬁc constant share βf of the worker’s
productivity, which is assumed to be known to both sides. There are no unem-
ployment beneﬁts. Vacancy opening has a ﬁxed cost of C per vacancy. Thus,
payoﬀs are as in equation 1.
Unemployed : wU = 0
Employees : wE = βf · pi
Employers : wS =
Nf,t X
i=1
(1 − βf)pi − C · Vf,t
(1)
3.1.2 Choices
Each individual has an intrinsic productivity pi ∈ [pmin,pmax]. Every period,
she faces a two-stage decision. First, she must decide whether to remain passive,
i.e. be content with her actual position, or active. If she is discontent with her
actual position, either because she is unemployed or because she earns too little
money, she must decide whether to look for a new position or to become an
entrepreneur herself and start a new ﬁrm. These decisions are made by looking
only at present and expected income, with expectations formed adaptively. The
time horizon over which expectations are formed covers only one period ahead:
thus, individuals do not take into consideration intertemporal trade-oﬀs. The
motivation behind this modeling choice is twofold. On one side, the desire to
keep the model as simple as possible, especially since this is the ﬁrst attempt
to model the out-of-equilibrium properties of the labor market. On the other
side, the consideration that it makes little sense to consider a longer time hori-
zon when individuals form their expectations adaptively and do not engage in
intertemporal optimization.
5Stay or Go To decide whether to become active and try to improve her
income, each individual compares the expected income of staying in the present
position, we
stay, with an individual threshold Li:
we
stay = wi,t
Li = λi ¯ wt
(2)
where wi,t is the actual wage, ¯ wt is the average wage of period t and λi
is an individual constant. An individual becomes active if we
stay < Li. Thus,
individuals have adaptive expectations. Moreover, heterogeneity in λi means
that some individuals are more likely to be dissatisﬁed than others.
Search or Start Once an individual has become active, she decides whether
to apply for another vacancy or to start a new business herself by comparing
the expected payoﬀ of becoming an entrepreneur, we
start with an individual
threshold Hi:
we
start = ((1 − βf) ¯ p − C)Vf,t
Hi = ηi ¯ wt
(3)
where β is the share of the productivity that the would-be entrepreneur is
willing to leave to the prospective workers, ¯ p is the average productivity, C is the
cost of opening a vacancy and Vf,t is the number of vacancies that the would-be
entrepreneur plans to open. Finally, ¯ wt is, as before, the average wage and ηi
is an individual constant. She thus expects (i) to ﬁll all the vacancies, and (ii)
that the workers in the new ﬁrm will average the same productivity as in the
population, which in turn is supposed to be known. A new startup is formed if
we
start > Hi. In order to increase the realism of the model, the Start option is
available only if the individual has a positive income at the time of the choice,
i.e. if she was employed in the previous period 4. An active individual that
does not try to set up a business on her own starts sending out applications to
other vacancies. The search eﬀort is modeled by a parameter a, which controls
for the number of applications that she is able to send each period.
3.2 Firms
3.2.1 Vacancies and growth
In order to compute we
start in eq. 3, an individual must decide how many
vacancies to open in the case of a new startup. It is assumed that each time
an individual faces this choice, she has in mind a desired dimension νf for the
startup. This desired dimension may be related to the minimum eﬃcient scale
for the new business. Heterogeneity in νf accounts for heterogeneity in the
4at the moment of making the choice an individual with positive income can thus be
either employed or, in case her ﬁrm was closed after the previous period, unemployed (see
ﬁgure 1 below for the sequence of events). However, long-term unemployed cannot become
entrepreneurs.
6business ideas, in the entrepreneurial talent, in the sectors of activity. Each
period a ﬁrm opens the closest integer number of vacancies to
Vf,t = δ (νf − Nf,t−1) (4)
where Nf,t−1 is the size of the ﬁrm at the previous period (it is 0 at the
startup) and δ is a gap-ﬁlling rate.
Entrepreneurial talent is thus summarized by 2 parameters: νf, the desired
size for the prospective startup, and βf, the Nash bargaining threshold in wage
setting. These parameters change every time the individual faces the choice of
becoming an entrepreneur, as many diﬀerent business models may be taken into
consideration.
3.2.2 Death
Firms die because all employees decide to leave, or because they make nega-
tive proﬁts. They cannot ﬁnance negative periods with the proﬁts they have
possibly saved in previous positive periods. 5 It is assumed that when a ﬁrm
goes bankrupt it is still able to pay wages. However, all employees become
unemployed.
3.3 Matching
Job seekers apply to vacancies randomly. Vacancies can receive multiple appli-
cations. For each vacancy, applicants are ranked by their productivity, which is
assumed to be certain and known to both sides (no asymmetric information).
Firms try ﬁrst to hire the most productive worker, by oﬀering her the ﬁrm-
speciﬁc share of her productivity. The worker accepts only if she is proposed a
wage increase. The model thus allows for on-the-job searching. Moreover, this
mechanism implies that a worker can receive multiple oﬀers in one period, and
choose the best one.
3.4 Transition matrix
The rules described above deﬁne a transition matrix between four diﬀerent
states: unemployment with zero or negative income (U0), unemployment with
positive income (U+), employment (E) and self-employment (S). The events
that drive each transition are listed in table 1. The Appendix reports all transi-
tion probabilities. However, they are not stationary, and thus it is not possible
to compute the long-run limiting distribution of the underlying Markov chain
using the global balance equations. 6
5It could be argued that a ﬁrm should be closed when the payoﬀs for the entrepreneur are
lower than those expected from becoming an employee. However, entrepreneurial decisions in
the real world are often characterized by inertia: otherwise, we would not be able to explain
bankruptcy. Considering both causes of ﬁrm closure would add too complication to the model:
hence the decision to focus only on bankruptcy.
6An example of a search model for which the global balance equations have been used to
solve for the equilibrium is [35].
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Choice Parameters
λi R+ Low wage threshold
ηi R+ High wage threshold
βf [0,1] Nash share
νf R++ Desired size
Table 2: Parameters
3.5 Model’s parameters
As we have seen, the model has 8 parameters, of which 4 are choice variables.
They are summarized in table 2.
λi and ηi account for risk aversion. Having a lower value for λi implies an
individual is less likely to be dissatisﬁed and thus become active. Having a higher
value for ηi implies an individual is less keen on becoming an entrepreneur. βf
and νf fully characterize ﬁrms. βf refers to how aggressive a ﬁrm is toward its
employees. Having a lower value for βf implies the ﬁrm keeps a higher share of
the total productivity, which is good for proﬁts. However, since it pays lower
wages it is less likely to attract and retain workers. Vacancies are thus more
diﬃcult to ﬁll, which is bad for proﬁts. Similarly, having a higher value for the
desired size νf implies more proﬁt opportunities but more risk to have unﬁlled
vacancies. Good ﬁrms have good combinations of these two parameters. But
such proﬁtable combinations will of course change with time, being a function
of the distribution of the βf and the νf in the population of ﬁrms and the
distribution of the productivity pi, the λi and the ηi both of employed and of
unemployed workers.
As already noted, βf and the νf are ﬁrm-speciﬁc. Thus, the same individual
may try to create diﬀerent startups with diﬀerent values of these parameters.
3.6 Optimization
The values of the λi, the ηi, the βf and the νf are optimized through evolu-
tionary learning. Firms with negative proﬁts exit the market, with their bad
combinations of the Nash share and desired size. Individuals with lower income
update their behavior by drawing (randomly) a diﬀerent value for the lower and
9higher wage thresholds. This is a form of very primitive optimization, since new
strategies are not inﬂuenced by the existing ones. 7
4 Solution of the model
The dynamics of the model is investigated by means of an agent-based simula-
tion. Note that in a simulation model, like in reality, it is not easy to let the
agents behave as if some equilibrium condition has to be met. Agents must
be able, at each point in time, to compute their action, given their state, the
state of (some) other agents and possibly history. Imposing equilibrium condi-
tions forces the system to “jump” to the equilibrium. This is the standard way
to proceed in analytical models, since adding equilibrium conditions generally
simpliﬁes the equations, allowing algebraic solutions. But it may happen than
by imposing directly the equilibrium from the outset we loose some interesting
properties of the out-of-equilibrium adjustment path. An alternative way of
deﬁning the equilibrium is to let it emerge, and look for the stationarity of some
aggregate variables, given detailed micro-rules that specify the agents’ behav-
ior and the interaction structure. This is the approach followed in this work,
which calls for the use of an agent-based simulation. Indeed, this work has to
be regarded as an example of what might get lost when using the traditional
approach of imposing the equilibrium conditions as a way to “solve” the model.
The simulation is written in Java and is based on the JAS platform [38]. 8
Figure 1 reports the event schedule of the simulation. There are four basic
entities: workers, ﬁrms, vacancies and the environment (named “the model”)
from which the simulation is controlled. Each period, ﬁrms with negative proﬁts
are closed down (by the closeNegativeProﬁtFirms method), unﬁt agents evolve
and draw a new set of parameters λi and ηi (evolveUnﬁtAgents). Then, each
existing ﬁrm posts the new vacancies, if any (postVacancies). After this step,
every individual decides what to do, by invoking the two methods shouldIS-
tayOrShouldIGo and – conditional on becoming active – shouldIStartOrShould-
ISearch. After all agents have made up their mind, those who have decided
to become entrepreneurs start their own business (start), and open additional
vacancies (with a call to the already known postVacancies method). Now that
all vacancies are posted, those agents who wish to search for a new job post
their applications (search). Then ﬁrms select the candidates, if any, for their
vacancies (selectApplicant), produce (produce) – which sums up all employees’
productivities – and ﬁnally divide the output between wages and proﬁts (pay).
7More sophisticated speciﬁcations of the learning process, for instance by means of genetic
algorithms, have been tested but do not alter qualitatively the results of the model. They do
introduce, however, the possibility of multiple stationary states.
8The simulation code is available from the author upon request.
10Figure 1: Event schedule
5 Results
5.1 Parameters and initial conditions
Here are the values of the parameters used in the simulation. In t = 0 (initial
conditions) everybody is unemployed and there are no ﬁrms. Individual pro-
ductivity is a random extraction from a uniform distribution U(0,10). 9 λi
is a random extraction from U(0,1). ηi is a random extraction from U(1,2).
βf is a random extraction from U(0,1). Desired size is a random extraction
from U(0,N/10), where N is the number of agents (generally 1000). The ﬁxed
cost of opening a vacancy, C, is kept constant at 2, i.e. 40% of the average
productivity. The gap-ﬁlling rate δ is equal to 0.5. Two additional constraints
are added to the rule for vacancy determination, to increase the realism of the
model. The maximum number of vacancies a ﬁrm can open at its startup is lim-
ited to 10, while in subsequent periods it is limited to the actual size of the ﬁrm
9Many empirical studies point out that individual productivity is far from being uniformly
distributed, and a lognormal approximation is generally assumed. Here however, the point
is to show that a uniform distribution for productivity is suﬃcient to generate a skewed
distribution for wages. Individual wages are linked to individual productivity, but the selection
eﬀect is such that a skewed distribution of wages for employed people emerges (see ﬁgure 7
below). Note that the only eﬀect of scaling up (or down) the productivity distribution is
to proportionally scale up (or down) the wage distribution and aggregate production. More
interesting eﬀects come from changing the shape of the productivity distribution. A wider
distribution (more heterogeneity) implies more turbulence in the labor market, as more people
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Figure 2: State probabilities
(the growth rate cannot exceed 1). A ﬁrst calibration of the model suggested
choosing a value for search intensity (the number of applications an individual
can send each period) of 0.3, i.e. 1 application every 3 periods, on average 10.
Finally, individual learning involves the poorest quartile of the population, in
terms of income.
5.2 Convergence
Figure 2 shows how the system converges to a stationary state. Starting from
a 0-employment situation, the equilibrium unemployment rate for the values of
the parameters described above is around 13% 11; about 78% of the population is
employed 12, while the remaining 9% have become entrepreneurs. This (unique)
stationary state is reached irrespective of the initial conditions.
Note that the system has very few degrees of freedom. Of the eight parame-
ters in table 2, four (the choice parameters) are endogenously determined. δ, the
gap-ﬁlling rate aﬀects only the speed of convergence. Holding constant produc-
tivity distribution, there are only two parameters left: the vacancy opening cost
C and the search intensity parameter a. Figure 3 shows what happens when
search intensity is increased, for increasing values of the vacancy cost. A higher
search intensity lowers the stationary state unemployment rate, while bigger
vacancy costs increase it. All other dynamics remain qualitatively unaﬀected.
Note that when C reaches the values of 5 the stationary state unemployment
10the reader could think in terms of weeks
11sticking to the interpretation of 1 period = 1 week, this value is an upper bound for
the “true” unemployment rate, since the deﬁnition of unemployment generally refers to non
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Figure 3: Stationary state, sensitivity analysis
rate jumps to 1. This is due to the fact that the expected value of ﬁlling one
vacancy, given the productivity distribution, is exactly 5. Nobody will then
open new vacancies.
Learning is seen by a change in the average value of the 4 choice parameters
(ﬁgure 4). The system needs about 100 periods to stabilize. The stationary
average values for λ and η, the low and high income thresholds, are about .46
and about 1.45, while the average β converges to a value of about .74. Note that
the average desired size ν for employers is diﬀerent (actually lower) than the one
for unemployed workers, meaning that the model is able to discriminate between
good and bad entrepreneurs. Moreover, the average value for the productivity
of employed workers is higher than for unemployed workers (ﬁgure 5). This is
due (i) to the rule for applicant selection, and (ii) to the fact that wages are
proportional to productivity, and thus workers with higher productivity are less
likely to be dissatisﬁed and thus start a risky entrepreneurial activity themselves.
5.3 Identiﬁcation issues
I now turn to the problem of identifying a Wage curve in the artiﬁcial data. If
one considers the WC simply as an empirical regularity, looking at the corre-
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Figure 5: Productivity, average values
14productivity level are taken into account) is enough. However, the alternative
approach to treat the WC as a quasi-labor supply function implies the need
to distinguish, in the artiﬁcial as well as in the real data, between aggregate
demand and supply. Recall that the decision of becoming active depends on
expected wages. Once individuals are active, they must choose between becom-
ing self-employed or looking for vacancies: the choice of becoming self-employed
depends on the average productivity, while the decision to accept a job oﬀer
depends entirely on the proposed wage, which in turns depends on productivity.
Thus, individual (and aggregate) labor supply depends on wage and productiv-
ity, as in the standard Wage curve setting [5]. On the other hand, the demand
for labor of individual ﬁrms does not depend neither on wages nor on produc-
tivity. However, since some ﬁrms go bankrupt and bankruptcy depends also on
the wage bill and the productivity of employed workers, the aggregate demand
for labor turns out to depend on these two variables too, and an identiﬁcation
problem arises. Fortunately, the aggregate labor demand depends also on the
distribution of the ν parameter (desired size), whose evolution is only weakly
correlated to wages and productivity. Thus, the variation of this parameter
allows the identiﬁcation of the WC, once controlling for the productivity of
employed workers.
5.4 Equilibrium
As shown above, the system reaches its stationary state after approximately
75-100 periods. To investigate its equilibrium properties, the ﬁrst 150 periods
are discarded; then, artiﬁcial data from t = 150 to t = 300 are analyzed. 13
Figure 6 shows the standard aggregate properties concerning the labor mar-
ket. Both the Beveridge curve and the Okun curve have the expected negative
slope, although the OC looks ﬂatter than in the empirical evidence. The Wage
curve shows a positive slope: however, after controlling for productivity the
slope becomes not signiﬁcant. The intuition behind this behavior is simple. In
the steady state, the probability of a ﬁrm going bankrupt is inversely propor-
tional to the productivity of its employees. Hence, dismissed workers have on
average a lower productivity than workers in surviving ﬁrms. At an aggregate
level, this implies that a higher unemployment rate corresponds to a higher av-
erage productivity. Since wages are directly related to productivity (β being
constant in the stationary state), this explains their positive correlation with
unemployment, which however vanishes after controlling for productivity.
10 runs are performed, and for each of them simple regressions are run over
the periods t = 150 − 300 in order to test for the slope of the three curves.
The regression models for the BC and OC have just one independent variable
13Note that in the perspective of equilibrium models, every point of an equilibrium relation is
a ﬁxed point, for particular values of the parameters. Assuming the real world is in equilibrium,
we could typically observe the curve described by the model by looking at cross-sectional data.
On the other hand, in the stationary state of a non-equilibrium, stochastic model like this one
every period corresponds to a point in the stationary state relationship. Assuming the real
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Figure 6: Wage, Beveridge and Okun curve, stationary state
(respectively, the vacancy rate and the GDP growth rate), plus the constant.
When looking for the WC I also control for the average level of productivity
of employed workers. Table 3 shows that the regularities described above are
fairly robust. For each curve, the average slope and the standard deviation of
the coeﬃcients across all simulation runs is reported 14, at the end of the table.
15
Until now, the model has shown a behavior roughly in line with standard
equilibrium search models. But having an agent-based simulation model, it is
easy to investigate other implicit properties of the model, in particular concern-
ing ﬁrm demography, wages and proﬁts.
A graphical inspection of ﬁrm size, wage and proﬁt distribution (ﬁgure 7)
shows the typical asymmetric shapes normally considered as stylized facts in
the industrial organization literature. The large number of ﬁrms with negative
proﬁts refers to the entrepreneurs who try to set up their own startup and fail,
generally within one single period. Note that the shape of the wage distribution
is not an artifact of the model, since we started with a uniform distribution for
individual productivity, on which wages are based.
5.5 The experiments
Once the system has converged to its stationary state, two kinds of negative
shocks are simulated. The ﬁrst one involves the exogenous destruction of 5% of
14note that the standard deviation of the coeﬃcients is not the average of the standard
errors
15Further details on the regressions results can be obtained from the author upon request.
16time 150-300
WC BC OC
y ¯ w v g
x u u ˙ u
run sign of the coeﬀ.
0 − − − − − −
1 − − − − − −
2 − − − −−
3 − − − − − −
4 − − − − − −
5 − − − − − −
6 − − − − − −
7 − − − − − −
8 − − − − − −
9 − − − − − −
average -0.025 -4.012 -0.123
std.dev. 0.115 0.601 0.039
*** conﬁdence interval > .99
** conﬁdence interval > .95
* conﬁdence interval > .90
∗ = {+, −}
Table 3: Wage, Beveridge and Okun curve, stationary state
the ﬁrms, irrespective of size, age, proﬁts or any other ﬁrm attribute (random
closure). The second one refers to a 5% probability of any worker being ﬁred,
irrespective of individual or ﬁrm characteristics (random ﬁring). Both events
persist over time, until a new stationary state is reached. Figure 8a shows the
time series for the unemployed, the employed and the self-employed for one
simulation run. At t = 300 the ﬁrst shock arrives and persists for 50 periods,
after which the system slowly goes back to the previous stationary state. The
second shock arrives at t = 500, also to last for 50 periods. Note that it takes
some time for the new adverse conditions to display all their eﬀects. However,
the time needed to absorbe the shock, once the previous conditions are restored,
is much longer. Note also that the eﬀects of the ﬁrst shock, the random closure
of ﬁrms, are stronger than those of the second shock, the random ﬁring of
employees.
The two types of shocks diﬀer in one, very signiﬁcant, way. While an in-
creased probability of being ﬁred does not have a disruptive, systemic eﬀect until
this probability becomes very high, randomly closing down some ﬁrms exhibits
a typical threshold eﬀect. When the share of ﬁrms exogenously closed is suﬃ-
ciently low, nothing happens. But when this share exceeds a critical level, the
system reorganizes on a new stationary state with a much higher unemployment
rate, as in ﬁgure 8a. Figure 8b supports this argument by showing what happens
with smaller shocks. The two shocks described above now involve, respectively,
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Figure 7: Firm size and income, stationary state
absorbed, and is not detectable in the artiﬁcial data (t = 300 − 350), while the
second one still has a negative impact on the unemployment rate (t = 500−550),
although less than in the previous case.
In the new perturbed steady state the system exhibits the same qualitative
behavior as in the unperturbed steady state: the Wage curve does not show
up, while the Beveridge and the Okun curves maintain their negative slope.
However, the BC is shifted outwards, as is often documented in the empirical
evidence, and the Okun curve is steeper.
5.6 Out-of-equilibrium dynamics
It is now interesting to see how the system reacts when the two exogenous
perturbances are removed, and the system goes back to its original stationary
state. After graphical inspection, it was decided to focus on a 150-period interval
after the end of the ﬁrst shock (t = 350 − 500), and on a 100-period interval
after the end of the second shock (t = 550 − 650).
In particular, it is interesting to see whether the shape of the Wage, Bev-
















































Figure 8: Eﬀects of adverse shocks
lowing paragraphs are devoted to each of these issues.
5.6.1 Wage, Beveridge and Okun curve
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Figure 9: Wage, Beveridge and Okun curve, out-of-equilibrium
At the beginning of the adjustment process, when the unemployment rate is
still far from its equilibrium value, the Wage Curve points south-west. Toward
the end of the adjustment process, when the unemployment rate gets closer
to its equilibrium value, the WC starts pointing north-west, thus exhibiting
a negative slope. Finally, when the system reaches its stationary state again,
the WC starts behaving again as described in section 5.4. The plots show
the raw correlation between wages and unemployment. After controlling for
19productivity, the positive slope found at the beginning of the adjustment process
looses signiﬁcance in some runs. However, the negative slope during the ﬁne-
tuning of the adjustment process remains highly signiﬁcant. At the same time,
the Beveridge Curve shows an inward shift, that slows down toward the end of
the adjustment process. Eventually, the BC recovers its traditional negatively
sloped shape. The Okun Curve on the other side keeps its negative slope through
all the adjustment processes.
These ﬁrst, descriptive ﬁndings are analyzed more in depth by running again
simple regressions on the artiﬁcial data coming from the same 10 simulation
runs. The length considered for the adjustment process to take place is kept
constant throughout all the simulation runs (see above). Similarly, the turning
point for the Wage Curve is supposed to take place at u = 0.2 for all the simu-
lation runs. These two simpliﬁcations may have an adverse eﬀect on the results
of the regressions, since in each simulation run the transient dynamics of the
system change slightly. So, it may happen that for some simulation runs the
adjustment process actually takes less (or more) than 150 periods after the end
of the ﬁrst shock and 100 periods after the end of the second shock. The anal-
ysis may thus either mix together data from the out-of-equilibrium adjustment
process with data that already belongs to the unperturbed stationary state, or
consider a still incomplete adjustment process. The division between a ﬁrst and
a second part of the adjustment process, relevant for the Wage Curve, is also
somehow arbitrary and does not take into consideration the speciﬁc adjustment
process taking place in each simulation run. More sophisticated econometric
techniques could be used to detect the structural breaks in the data. However,
using a one-for-all, visual criterium turns out to be suﬃcient for the scope of
this analysis.
Table 4 reports the results of the regressions for the adjustment processes
after the removal of the two shocks. They conﬁrm the dynamics described
above. For each curve, the average slope across all simulation runs is reported,
together with the standard deviation, at the end of the table. 16
The intuition why a negative correlation between wages and unemployment
is found only out-of-equilibrium is the following. When the unemployment rate
is abnormally high, ﬁrms can aﬀord paying lower wages (retaining a higher
share β of the workers’ surplus), since they will still be able to attract some
applicants. However, as unemployment is driven back and the labor market
becomes tighter, competition makes it easier for ﬁrms oﬀering higher wages
to attract a higher share of the workforce. Thus, decreasing unemployment is
correlated with increasing wages, climbing up a negatively sloped Wage Curve.
This mechanism is shown in ﬁgure 10, where individual βs are weighted by
ﬁrm size. Note that the average β does not start to decrease immediately
after the shock is removed at time t = 350: there is a period of decreasing
unemployment when the labor market is still slack enough and ﬁrms face only
limited competition in attracting new workers or retaining existing employees.
This explains why a negative Wage Curve is recovered only in the ﬁnal stages
16Further details on the regression outputs can be obtained from the author upon request.
20time 350-500 550-650
WC BC OC WC BC OC
y ¯ w v g ¯ w v g
x u u ˙ u u u ˙ u
u ≥ .2 u < .2 u ≥ .2 u < .2
run sign of the coeﬀ.
0 + + + − − − + + + − − − + + + −− + + + − − −
1 + + + − − − + + + − − − + + + − − −
2 + + + −− + + + − − − − − − + + + − − −
3 − − − + + + − − − + + + −− + + + − − −
4 + + + − − − + + + − − − − − − + + + − − −
5 − − − + + + − − − − − − + + + − − −
6 + + + − − − + + + − − − + + + + − − −
7 − − − + + + − − − − − − − + + + − − −
8 + + + − − − + + + − − − + + + − − −
9 + + + − − − + + + − − − − − − + + + −−
average .341 -.515 4.223 -.739 .066 -.223 4.337 -.427
std.dev. .300 .255 .315 .213 .315 .167 .426 .101
*** conﬁdence interval > .99
** conﬁdence interval > .95
* conﬁdence interval > .90
∗ = {+, −}
Table 4: Wage, Beveridge and Okun curve, back from shocks 1 and 2
of big adjustment processes, or for small adjustment processes.
5.6.2 The matching function
Until now, nothing has been said about the matching function implied by the
model. However, we know that the existence of an aggregate (positive) relation-
ship between vacancies and unemployment, on one side, and job creation on the
other side has played a crucial role in the ﬁrst formulations of the equilibrium
unemployment theory (see [33]). The standard model actually assumes it, often
together with the additional restriction of a Cobb-Douglas functional form with
constant returns to scale (c.r.s.). A huge stream of literature then looked at the
empirical data, in order to test for this crucial claim [29]. Estimates of a c.r.s.
matching function – often of the Cobb-Douglas type – have been taken as proof
that the standard search model, which used it to derive equilibrium relations,
was “correct”.
To test the properties of the matching function in the model, a Cobb-Douglas
was ﬁtted on the artiﬁcial data coming from the 10 simulation runs. As table
5 shows, the model fails to derive a well-behaved matching function, in the
stationary state. The unemployment rate (u) and the vacancy rate (v) even have
a negative impact on the matching rate (m). However, during the adjustment
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Figure 10: Average β weighted by ﬁrm size
22the coeﬃcients in the log-log regression, which corresponds to the returns to
scale, averages 0.985 after the ﬁrst shock, and 0.945 after the second shock.
If the model is able to grasp something of the real world, it may be the case
that the empirical evidence of a c.r.s. matching function could be valid only
out-of-equilibrium.
time 150-300 350-500 550-650
equilibrium back from shock 1 back from shock 2
y logm
x logu logv logu logv logu logv
run sign of the coeﬀ.
0 − − − − − − + + + + + + + + + + + +
1 − − − − − − + + + + + + + + + + + +
2 − − − − − − + + + + + + + + + + + +
3 − − − − − − + + + + + + + + + + + +
4 − − − − − − + + + + + + + + + + + +
5 − − − − − − + + + + + + + + + + + +
6 − − − − − − + + + + + + + + + + + +
7 − − − − − − + + + + + + + + + + + +
8 − − − − − − + + + + + + + + + + + +
9 − − − − − − + + + + + + + + + + + +
average -1.161 - .710 .613 .372 .578 .367
std.dev. .148 .114 .055 .076 .115 .116
sum (r.s.) -1.871 0.985 0.945
*** conﬁdence interval > .99
** conﬁdence interval > .95
* conﬁdence interval > .90
∗ = {+, −}
Table 5: The matching function
6 Conclusions and directions for future work
The model developed in this paper is a non-equilibrium, agent-based model of
workers and ﬁrms, where workers have to decide whether to stay in their present
state, look for another employee or start a new business themselves, and ﬁrms
have to decide how many vacancies to open, and what wage they will oﬀer to
applicants. Workers and ﬁrms are heterogeneous, and learn their strategy in the
labor market. On-the-job searching is allowed. The model is a non-equilibrium
model because it does not make use of equilibrium conditions. However, it
gives raise to stationary states, which can be regarded as the equilibrium of the
model. In this sense equilibrium is not imposed; rather, it may emerge from the
interaction of all individual behaviors.
The dynamics diﬀer in the stationary and non-stationary state. The model
exhibits a Beveridge curve with negative slope, which moves quickly inward and
23outward during the early phases of the transition process, and shows a typical
spiral-like shape that eventually settles down to the traditional negative slope
during the late phases of the adjustment processes, or for small adjustments. A
negative sloped Okun curve is also recovered. There is no Wage curve in the
stationary states, since wages are mainly driven by productivity, or when the
labor market is too slack. However, a negative slope is observed in the ﬁnal part
of big adjustment process (or for small adjustment processes), when increasing
competition between ﬁrms in the labor market forces salaries up. Moreover,
during the transition processes the system exhibits a constant returns to scale
matching function, which vanishes in the stationary state. Thus, the outcomes
of the model are coherent with a description of the world as a disequilibrium
process, continuously trying to adapt to a changing environment. One could
thus question the appropriateness of equilibrium models based on these stylized
facts, if they can be interpreted as just out-of-equilibrium properties of the real
economies.
Two additional points need to be stressed. First, from a methodological
point of view, the use of non-equilibrium computational models allows for a more
comprehensive investigation of the labor market, by considering the endogenous
character of many relevant variables. To this respect, the large number of
stylized facts that the simple model of this paper is able to reproduce suggests
that this approach could be “the most suitable starting point for the extensions
that will eventually explain unemployment in real economies”, as Pissarides put
it.
Second, a need for a joint investigation of empirical regularities is identiﬁed.
The model suggests that the shape of the Wage curve is not independent of the
shape of the Beveridge and Okun curve, and both of them might be related to
the matching function. The somehow fuzzy evidence on the existence and the
slope of these curves may be due to the fact that the data considered by many
empirical studies belong to diﬀerent regimes, more or less distant from a station-
ary state. Great attention should then be paid to distinguishing between these
diﬀerent regimes, possibly with the help of the predictions of a model close in
spirit to the one presented here. For instance, in this model the Beveridge curve
acts as a good indicator of the transition process between diﬀerent stationary
states. Real data could then be grouped accordingly, in order to test some of
the implications of the model. In correspondence with strong inward-outward
shifts of the BC, according to the model, we should not be able to identify a
Wage curve, while a negatively sloped WC should emerge when these shifts slow
down. Moreover, the estimates of the matching function should also vary with
the shape of the BC, with a constant return to scale property being detectable
only during its inward-outward shifts. As data on vacancies are often diﬃcult to
collect, one could look at the correlation between the coeﬃcients of the match-
ing function and the slope of the Wage curve. However, the empirical testing of
the model, as well as a more accurate calibration of its structural parameters,
are left for future research.
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, where Λ is the cumulative distribution function of λi, is the probability







, where H is the cumulative distribution function of ηi, is the probability of making a
Start decision, conditional on being active. Pi,0 is said to be the probability that none of the applications sent out by individual
i is successful; Pα,0 the probability that the ﬁrm where the individual i was working before the move, if any, is closed down,
and Pω,0 the probability that the ﬁrm where the individual i is working after the move, if any, is closed down.
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